Myanmar-Naga Political Relations & Negotiations

Toward a Path to Peace and Understanding

The Panglong Agreement of February 12, 1947 marked the beginning of the process for the formation of Myanmar (formerly Burma). However, the Nagas were not signatories to the agreement. They did not participate in any political processes and remained isolated and independent, maintaining no formal ties with the newly formed country after Myanmar’s independence on January 4, 1948.

Progress Highlights of Myanmar-Naga Relations

Explore pivotal statistics that shed light on the Myanmar-Naga political relations & Negotiations.

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Years of Dialogue

This figure reflects the decades-long journey of negotiations for a peaceful resolution.

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Engaged Stakeholders

National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), and various Naga public organizations.

NIL

Policy Milestones

The policy milestones are effectively nil, as negotiations for a resolution to the Myanmar-Naga political conflict remain unresolved.

Key Insights (1947–Present)

Events and initiatives that foster dialogue, build understanding, misunderstanding, and the progress of Myanmar-Naga relations.

Historical Background

feb 12, 1947

The Panglong Conference of 1947 marked the beginning of the process for the formation of Myanmar (formerly Burma). However, representatives of all ethnic nationalities did not attend or sign the Panglong Agreement. The agreement was signed only by representatives of four groups: the Bama/Burman (Myanma), Chin, Kachin, and Shan.

The Nagas neither participated in the conference nor were signatories to the 1947 Panglong Agreement.

Myanmar (Burma) Independence

jan 4, 1948

The Naga areas in present-day Myanmar had no political relations with the newly independent Myanmar. The Nagas did not participate in any political processes and remained isolated / independent, maintaining no formal ties with the newly formed country.

Burmese Premier U Nu visited Kohima

mar 30, 1953

India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Burma’s first Prime Minister, U Nu, visited Kohima, the capital of present-day Nagaland, with one of their main objectives being to divide and consolidate control over the Naga homeland between India and Myanmar. However, their visit was met with strong resistance and public humiliation by the Nagas.

Naga Resistance in Border Areas

1953 – 1960s

Following the humiliation, India launched full-scale military operations in the Naga areas under its control. Many Nagas fled across the border into Myanmar to escape the Indian military campaign. Some Nagas from present-day Myanmar joined the Naga National Council (NNC), but they too faced repression by the Myanmar army (Tatmadaw).

Despite the escalating situation, no formal negotiations took place between Myanmar and the Nagas during this period.

Repression and Marginalization

1970s – 1980s

The Tatmadaw launched counter-insurgency operations in Naga areas near the border with India against the Nagas. The Myanmar government continued to ignore Naga political aspirations, leaving many Naga villages in Myanmar underdeveloped and heavily militarized.

NSCN-K Consolidates Its Bases

1988

In 1988, after the split of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), led by S.S. Khaplang, established strong bases in the Sagaing Region.

Period of Tactical Tolerance

1989 – 2009

No real political dialogue occurred, however, a tactical tolerance emerged between the Tatmadaw and the Nagas.

Political Reforms & The 2010 Constitution

2010 – 2012

Myanmar began limited democratic reforms, and under the 2010 Constitution, the Naga Self-Administered Zone (NSAZ) was created in the Sagaing Region, encompassing Lahe, Leshi, and Nanyun. While the NSAZ granted limited local administrative powers to the Nagas, it offered no real political autonomy or formal recognition of the Naga identity as a “nation.”

Bilateral Ceasefire Agreement

apr 9, 2012

In 2012, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) and the Myanmar government signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement outlining five points. Points 4 and 5 of the agreement stipulated that NSCN (K) members would be allowed to travel freely within Myanmar without arms during the ceasefire period and that negotiations would continue to promote peace, stability, and the development of the Naga region.

Period of Tactical Tolerance

2012 – 2015

The bilateral ceasefire did not lead to substantive political negotiations, as the Myanmar government continued to control the broader political narrative. Meanwhile, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) further strengthened its military bases in Myanmar.

Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)

2015 – 2019

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) refused to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the Myanmar government, despite repeated aggression from Naypyidaw and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army).

Myanmar Army Takes Control of NSCN-K HQ

jan 29, 2019

The Tatmadaw, however, refused to describe the operation as an “occupation.” The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) stated that it had “withdrawn its troops and allowed the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) to occupy its headquarters in order to avoid disrupting the peace process between the NSCN-K and the Myanmar government.”

Post-Coup Crisis in Myanmar

2021 – present

Following the military coup in February 2021, the peace process collapsed. The Tatmadaw tightened its control over ethnic regions, including the Naga Self-Administered Zone (SAZ). Naga political negotiations came to a complete halt, and the region became heavily militarized.

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Explore the Naga Political Movement

Historical Background

History & Legacy

Post-1947

Significant events shaping the peace talks.

Future Prospects

Understand potential outcomes and pathways ahead.

Explore the Ongoing Political Negotiations

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